China's Loss of Sovereignty in
Manchuria 1895 - 1914
(Part Two)
Author: James Graham Published: May, 2004
Once the dust had settled in Manchuria, Japan exploited its position
to increase its influence in the area at China's expense. To achieve its
aims Japan had negoiated with Russia a number of accords concerning China
at Portsmouth that it imposed on China in 1905. Secret protocols of the
treaty prevented China from constructing railways parallel, near or prejudicial
to Japan's. New claims were also made for Manchurian railways, mines,
timber and fishing rights. The most important right Japan gained was to
link the SMR to its Korean railroad via the An-feng line. This allowed
troops to be deployed to Manchuria rapidly if required. In 1906 Japan
reorganised the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) Company to exclude China
from any meaningful participation. Chinese officials in Manchuria tried
to delay, block and prevent these rights as best they could however they
received little help in this activity from Peking. At that time the Chinese
government felt it simply had no choice but to accept an increasing Japanese
presence in Manchuria.
Japan and Russia consolidated their respective positions in Manchuria
after the war by agreeing to working together to keep other powers out
and minimising Chinese government power in the area. American interest
in railways in Manchuria which reached a peek under Secretary of State
Philander Knox forced the two old enemies to work together. The Russian-Japanese
Treaty of July 1907 publicly marked off their spheres of influence and
respected the "independence and territorial integrity of the Empire
of China." Secretly the two countries agreed to respect only each
other's rights and powers and to defend the status quo against China.
Their relationship was reinforced by a further agreement in July 4 1910
that omitted any obligation to support the open door or the integrity
of China. In their respective spheres Japan and Russia exercised special
jurisdictional and administrative powers. These included the collection
of taxation, deployment of police, the transfer of property and the employment
of a limited number of railway guards. In the Liaotung leasehold Japan's
powers of administration and sovereignty were unlimited save the right
to alienate the territory. This situation remained until the outbreak
of war in 1914.
It is arguable how powerful and successful the Chinese officials stationed
in Manchuria were. That officials responsible to a government in Peking
were even present in Manchuria illustrates that China never lost complete
sovereignty over Manchuria. After 1897 the Liaotung leasehold was in practice
completely detached from China however this was only a very small, albeit
strategic part of Manchuria. To maintain and build Chinese sovereignty
in the remaining part of Manchuria policies of frontier defence and self-strengthening
were undertaken. This involved the promotion of Chinese run railways,
banks, mines and factories. Hsi-liang as governor-general of Manchuria
between 1909 and 1911 argued in favour of all four projects but was constantly
unable to obtain finance for any major project in this time. Peking was
not only extremely weak but the Japanese and Russians were able to successful
prevent foreign bankers loaning any money designed to strengthen China's
position in Manchuria.
Above all frontier defence meant settlement as China's enormous population
was an advantage that the foreign powers could neither mitigate nor match.
The Qing dynasty's repeal of prohibitions preventing Han Chinese settlement
in the Manchu homeland led to the Manchurian population increasing from
six million in 1897 to 15-17 million by the end of the dynasty. It is
debatable as to how much the Chinese authorities can take credit for this
however, as the increase was more likely a natural phenomenon of population
pressure in central and northern China. China's frontier defence thus
achieved little that would not have occurred without a central government.
Diplomatically China's greatest effort in this period went into persuading
the United States that an independent China was crucial to its interests
in East Asia. This policy followed a long Chinese tradition of playing
one Barbarian off against another and thereby preventing any of them from
dominating China. Li Hong-Zhang had organised the Li-Lobanov Treaty precisely
to play Russia off against Japan. The US for its part was convinced that
its domestic problem of overproduction could be cured by new overseas
markets. It was further believed that if Manchuria was lost to foreign
control it would lead to the general partitioning of China. These concerns
by the turn of the century were held for all of China by Great Britain
and the United States, a concern great enough that American Secretary
of State John Hay sent a note in September 1899 and again in July 1900
to each foreign power urging them to respect China's territorial integrity
and to permit open trade in China. The notes were the start of a decade
of joint Sino-American effort to ensure China's territorial integrity
in Manchuria. The effort brought almost no results apart from the psychological
benefit America's active support had on the Chinese and the pause it gave
Russia and Japan. The end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 precipitated the
complete collapse of the open door. Ultimately the US could achieve no
concrete or vital interests in Manchuria due to Japanese and Russian obstruction.
Thus they has no choice but to seek an accommodation with Japan. Likewise
the Chinese side after many disappointments had lost faith in the US by
1911 and viewed it as only vaguely different from other powers.
China starting from a position of strength in Manchuria in 1894 increasingly
lost sovereignty over the area. By 1914 the majority of Manchuria was
neither independent nor under the complete control of a central Chinese
government. Defeated in war and unable to stop the first 'modern war'
being fought on its soil any continued Chinese control of Manchuria no
matter how small was an achievement, but an achievement that the Chinese
governments can claim little credit for as only inter-power rivalry and
Han Chinese settlement prevented the complete detachment of the area from
China.
